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In an attribute-based system (ABS), users are identified by various attributes, instead of their
identities. Since its seminal introduction, the attribute-based mechanism has attracted a lot of
attention. However, current ABS schemes have a number of drawbacks: (i) the communication cost
is linear in the number of the required attributes; (ii) the computation cost is linear in the number of
the required attributes and (iii) there are no efficient verification algorithms for the secret keys. These
drawbacks limit the use of ABS in practice. In this paper, we propose an attribute-based oblivious
access control (ABOAC) scheme to address these problems, where only the receiver whose attributes
satisfy the access policies can obtain services obliviously. As a result, the receiver does not release
anything about the contents of the selected services and his attributes to the sender, and even the
number and supersets of his attributes are protected. The sender only knows the number of the
services selected by the authorized receiver. Notably, the costs of computation and communication
are constant and independent of the number of required attributes. While, in the prior comparable
schemes, both the costs of computation and communication are linear in the required attributes.
Therefore, our ABOAC scheme provides a novel and elegant solution to protect user’s privacy in the
systems where both the bandwidth and the computing capability are limited, such as wireless sensor
and actor networks, mobile ad hoc networks, etc..
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1. INTRODUCTION
Access control is usually designed to determine which resources
can be accessed by the authorized users. In order to access a
resource, a user must authenticate himself to a trusted third party
(TTP) to be granted an access permission. Considering different
access requirements, various access control protocols have been
proposed to protect sensitive resources, such as discretionary
access control [1], mandatory access control [2], attribute-based
access control (ABAC) [3–7], role-based access control [8–10],
purpose-based access control [11, 12] and hierarchical access
control [13, 14].
In an ABAC system, an access request is accepted or denied
depending upon whether the attributes of the requester sat-
isfy the access policies. The ‘magic’ of ABAC not only lies
in its high flexibility and strong expressibility, but also in
its anonymity. For example, Jack associates a service with
a set of attributes S = {European, Adult, Student} such
that only the user whose attributes includes S can access
the service. Suppose that two users Alice and Bob hold
attribute SA = {European, Married, Adult, Student} and SB =
{European, Adult, Vegetarian, Student}, respectively. Jack
cannot decide whether the service is obtained by Alice or Bob,
because both of them are authorized to access the service. What
Jack knows is S ⊆ SA and S ⊆ SB. Therefore, Jack cannot iden-
tify the identity of the real receiver from the required attributes.
This implies that ABAC can provide anonymity to users.
Although attribute-based systems are flexible, the compu-
tation cost and communication cost are linear in the num-
ber of the required attributes. Current ABAC schemes are not
suitable to the system with limited communication and com-
putation ability, such as wireless sensor and actor networks
(WSANs) and mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). In WSANs,
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2 J. Han et al.
the sensors are lower price and lower power devices with limited
sensing, computation and wireless communication ability [15].
The nodes in MANETs have limited power, computation ability
and small memory space [16]. Therefore, it is an interesting and
challenging work to construct an ABAC scheme where both the
communication cost and the computation cost are constant.
1.1. Related work
Being different from an identity-based encryption (IBE)
[17–20], attribute-based encryption (ABE) provides a sound
solution to encrypt a message for all users who hold the required
attributes, without any knowledge of their exact identities. The
first ABE scheme was proposed by Sahai and Waters [21] based
on linear secret sharing [22], where both the ciphertext and the
secret key are labeled with a set of attributes. A user can decrypt
the ciphertext if and only if there is a match between his secret
key and the ciphertext. This idea was originally used to design an
error-tolerant (or fuzzy) IBE. There are two types of ABE: Key-
Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Cipher-Policy ABE (CP-ABE).
(i) In a KP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext is labeled with
a set of attributes; while the secret keys of the user
are associated with an access policy (access structure).
A user can decrypt the ciphertext, if and only if he
has obtained the required secret keys corresponding to
attributes listed in the ciphertext [21, 23, 24].
(ii) In a CP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext is associated with
an access policy (access structure); while the secret
keys of the user are labeled with a set of attributes.
A user can decrypt the ciphertext, if and only if his
attributes satisfy the access policy [25–29].
To obtain the fine-grained access, Goyal et al. [23] proposed a
new ABE scheme, where access trees were exploited. There is a
threshold gate in each non-leaf node of the tree, which consists
of its children and a threshold value. Each leaf is associated
with an attribute. Both ABE schemes in [21, 23] are monotonic,
namely Alice, who holds a set of attributes SA, can decrypt
a ciphertext, then Bob, who holds a set of attributes SB, can
decrypt the ciphertext, if and only if SA ⊆ SB.
Two non-monotonic ABE schemes were proposed by
Ostrovsky et al. [24] and Cheung and Newport [26],
respectively. In these schemes, negative attributes are
considered. Comparatively, non-monotonic ABE can express
more complicated access policies than monotonic ABE [24].
The former is referred to as KP-ABE, while the latter CP-ABE.
Goyal et al. [30] proposed a bounded CP-ABE, where the
access tree is bounded. This bound is determined in the system
setup phase, and is represented by the maximum depth of the tree
and the maximum number of children that each non-leaf node
in the tree has. Any access tree that satisfies the upper bound
can be selected by the encrypter to encrypt messages [31].
Attrapadung and Imai [32] proposed a new variant of
ABE called dual-policy ABE which combines KP-ABE with
CP-ABE. There are two access structures. One is over the
subjective attributes held by the user, and the other is over the
objective attributes ascribed to the encrypted data. Nevertheless,
there is only one access structure in both KP-ABE and CP-
ABE schemes.
In their seminal paper, Sahai and Waters [21] questioned
how to construct ABE schemes with multi-authorities, to
ensure the practicality of ABE. Chase [33] answered this
question affirmatively by proposing an ABE scheme with
multi-authorities. In this scheme, the user is required to obtain
his secret keys from some of the distributed authorities. This
scheme can be used to resist the attack from the untrusted
authority.
One intrinsic flaw of ABE is that the length of the cipher-
text is linear in the number of the required attributes in both
KP-ABE and CP-ABE. Solutions towards reducing the length
of the ciphertext have been proposed. Although the comput-
ing costs of the encryption algorithms in these schemes are
constant, the exponential and pairing operations executed in
the decryption stage are linear in the number of the required
attributes. Therefore, these schemes are not an ideal primitive
for the systems where the receiver only has limited computing
ability (such as WSANs, MANETS, etc.). To name a few,
Herranz et al. [27] proposed a threshold ABE with constant
ciphertext. This scheme was based on the threshold public-key
encryption proposed by Delerablée and Pointcheval [34]. For
each attribute, there exists a secret key. Before decryption, the
user must aggregate all his secret keys to one value, by using
the algorithm Aggregate introduced in [35]. As mentioned in
[35], the running time of the algorithm Aggregate is about
(γ (γ − 1)/2)Texp, where γ and Texp denote the number of the
attributes and the running time of one exponentiation, respec-
tively. Zhou and Huang [36] proposed a CP-ABE scheme
with constant ciphertext based on the q-decisional bilinear
Diffie-Hellman exponential (q-DBDHE) assumption. The
computational cost of the encryption algorithm is constant,
while the pairing operations in the decryption stage is linear
in the number of the required attributes. Emura et al. [37]
also proposed an CP-ABE scheme with constant ciphertext,
where for a set of attributes, there is only one secret key. In this
scheme, a user can only decrypt the ciphertext that requires
the exact attributes which he holds. The user cannot decrypt
the ciphertext where the required attributes are included in his
attributes, because the user cannot use his attributes separately.
From this point, this scheme is more like an IBE scheme, where
all the held attributes can be mapped into the sole identity of
the user. Attrapadung et al. [38] proposed a KP-ABE scheme
with constant ciphertext. Whereas, both the exponential and
the pairing operations executed in the decryption phase are
linear in the number of the required attributes.
Recently, Chen et al. [39] proposed a non-monotonic CP-
ABE scheme with constant ciphertext and constant computation
cost. Both [38, 39] are based on non-standard assumption,
namely q-DBDHE assumption.
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ABE schemes based on linear secret key sharing scheme
[22] are subject to collusion attack. This attack was defined by
Sahai and Waters [21]. Referring back to the example described
in the beginning, suppose that Alice holds a set of attributes
SA = {European, Student}, and Bob holds a set of attributes
SB = {American, Adult}. If Alice and Bob collude, they can
collaborate to get attributes S = {European, Adult, Student}
to access the source. An ABE scheme is secure against the
collusion attacks, if multiple users collude, they can only
decrypt the ciphertext which one of them can decrypt by
himself.
In anABE scheme, a user is required to obtain a secret key for
each attribute of him. Generally speaking, the user can decrypt
a ciphertext by using a subset of his secret keys. If the received
secret keys cannot be verified, it is hard to guarantee that the
secret keys are generated correctly and not tampered. In the
scenario that the user cannot decrypt a ciphertext when his
attributes satisfy the access policies, he cannot determine which
secret keys caused this. He also cannot detect whether his secret
keys or the cihpertext are not constructed correctly. Especially,
if the issuer and the encrypter are different entities, the user
cannot detect who is malicious. This will risk the user’s access
right. Meanwhile, most of the previous schemes did not provide
a verification algorithms for the secret keys.
Although anonymity can be used to protect the privacy of
users, it is unfortunately insufficient [40]. This is because
anonymity can hide who the user is, but it cannot hide what
actions the user performed. For instance, suppose that a user can
access resources anonymously. We cannot identify who he/she
is, but we can guess that it is Alice with high probability, if it can
access Alice’s medical data, financial condition and insurance
records. Hence, in terms of privacy, we require a system to hide
both the identity of the user and the actions performed.
Proposed by Rabin [41], k-out-of-m oblivious transfer (OTmk )
is a protocol where the sender and the receiver have a set
of messages M = {M1, M2, . . . , Mm} and a set of choices
C = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , m}, respectively. After a
transfer, the receiver can obtain messages {Mσ1 , Mσ2 , . . . , Mσk },
while the sender knows nothing about the receiver’s choices.
Adaptive k-out-of-m oblivious transfer (OTmk×1) is a strongly
secure OT, where the receiver can obtain messages from the
sender adaptively [42, 43]. OT has been used as a primitive to
hide users’ actions [44–46].
Friken et al. [5] proposed three ABAC schemes, where both
the access policies and the attributes of the receiver can be
hidden. In the first scheme, the receiver knows a superset of the
attributes required by the access policy. In the second scheme,
the receiver knows the number of the attributes that he satisfies.
While, in the third scheme, the receiver only knows the upper
bound of the attributes that he can use to access the system. The
sender knows the number of attributes that the receiver uses to
access the system, and nothing else. They based their scheme
on homomorphic encryption [47], 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer
[41] and set intersection [48]. Their schemes provided a sound
solution to protect users’ privacy. One pitiable thing of their
schemes is their efficiency. The communication complexity in
these three schemes are O(n), O(γn) and O(γn), respectively,
where n is the number of the attributes listed in the access
policies, and γ is the number of the attributes held by the user.
For each attribute listed in the access policy, the encryption
operations required in these schemes are O(1), O(γ ) and O(γ ),
respectively. The interactions for each attribute are three rounds,
five rounds and five rounds, respectively. And also, the cost of
computation will depend on the exploited encryption scheme
and the OT scheme.
Coull et al. [45] proposed an oblivious transfer with
access control (AC-OT) scheme by introducing an anonymous
credential scheme to an OT scheme, where the access policy
is a state graph. Each node in the graph is a state, and each
edge denotes a transaction from one state to another. For each
access to the database, the user must prove he has obtained the
required credentials (attribute) in zero-knowledge. Camenisch
et al. [46] proposed anotherAC-OT scheme that improved Coull
et al. [45] scheme. This scheme avoids to re-issue credentials at
each transfer by following two approaches. In the first approach,
they assign a state to a subset of attributes that a user can access
to, with a self-loop which can be accessed using this subset of
attributes. In the second approach, they assign a state to a subset
of attributes which are published as the access policy, with a
self-loop for each data which is associated with this subset of
attributes. Let |SCi | denote that the number of the attributes
required by the ith record (data), for i = 1, 2, . . . , m. For a
set of choices C = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk}, the computational cost and




Zhang et al. [49] proposed a new AC-OT scheme which is
based on the CP-ABE scheme [28] and OTmk scheme [50]. As
mentioned in [29], the CP-ABE scheme [28] constructed in the
composite order (N = p1p2p3) bilinear groups is not efficient,
where p1, p2 and p3 are different prime numbers. This scheme
has the ciphertext which is linear in the number of the required
attributes. Both the exponential and the pairing operations
executed in the decryption stage are linear in the number of
the required attributes. Furthermore, in order to introduce the
CP-ABE scheme [40] to OTmk scheme [50], a data encapsulated
mechanism must be employed to encrypt the messages from
different message spaces. Hence, the computational cost and
communication cost in this scheme are O(
∑k
i=1 |SCσi |) and
O(
∑m
i=1 |SCi |), respectively.
Rial and Preneel [51] proposed a blind ABE and an AC-
OT scheme by providing a blind key extract protocol for the
CP-ABE scheme [25]. CP-ABE scheme [25] was proved to be
secure in the generic group model, instead of reducing to a
complexity assumption. The ciphertext size and the computing
cost in the decryption stage in the CP-ABE scheme [25] are
linear in the number of the required attributes. Therefore, the
computational cost and communication cost in this scheme are
O(
∑k
i=1 |SCσi |) and O(
∑m
i=1 |SCi |), respectively.
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1.2. Our contribution
An ABE scheme is more efficient and it can express a fine-
gained access structure. An OT scheme is a primitive used to
protect the action performed by the user. Hence, the combination
of ABE and OT schemes provide a sound solution to protect
user’s privacy in an access control mechanism, especially,
in the privacy-sensitive systems, such as medical records,
patent searches, etc.. However, the computational cost and
communication cost in the existing schemes are linear in the
number of the required attributes. It is a challenging work to
construct an attribute-based oblivious access control (ABOAC)
scheme where both the computation cost and communication
cost are independent of the number of the required attributes.
This is necessary in the systems where both the computing
cost and communication cost are limited, such as WSANs [15],
MANETs [16], etc.
In this paper, we propose an ABE scheme with constant
ciphertext. We note that both the encryption and decryption
algorithms in our scheme are very efficient. For an encryption
and decryption procedure, only three exponentiations and
two pairing operations are executed, respectively. This is in
contrast to the previous ABE schemes where the numbers of
pairings and exponentiations executed in the encryption and
decryption phases are linear in the number of the required
attributes. Additionally, the secret key for each attribute can
be efficiently verified. Further, we extend our ABE scheme
to an ABOAC scheme, where the user can obtain services
obliviously, if his attributes satisfy the access policies. As a
result, the receiver releases nothing about his attributes and
the selected services to the sender. The sender only knows
the number of the selected services. Hence, both the identity
of the receiver and the actions performed by him can be
protected. In our ABOAC scheme, for each service encrypted
with the required attributes, only one-round interaction is
executed between the sender and the receiver. The sender
is required to execute three exponential operations, and the
receiver needs to execute two pairing and two exponential
operations.
1.3. Paper organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we review the preliminaries that are used throughout this paper.
A newABE with constant communication cost and computation
cost is proposed, and proved in Section 3. In Section 4, based on
the ABE proposed in Section 3, an ABOAC scheme is proposed
and proved. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the definitions and security models
of ABE and ABOAC. Then, the complexity assumptions used
throughout this paper are reviewed.
2.1. Attribute-based encryption
In the rest of this paper, by a
R← A, we denote that a is selected
at random from A. Especially, by a
R← A, we denote that a is
selected uniformly from A, if A is a finite set. By R
← S and
R
→ S, we denote that party S sends  to party R and party R
sends  to party S, respectively. If S is a finite set, we denote
|S| as the cardinality of S. By y ← A(x), we denote that y
is obtained by running algorithm A on input x. We say that a
function ε : Z → R is a negligible function, if for all z ∈ Z
there exists a k ∈ Z such that |ε(x)| < 1/xz for all x > k. By 
and 1, we denote a security parameter and the string of  ones.
We denote KG(1) as a key generator which takes as input 1
and outputs a secret-public key pair.
Definition 2.1 (Access Structure) [52]. Let {P1, P2, . . . , Pn}
be a set of parties. A collection A ⊂ 2{P1,P2,...,Pn} is
monotone, if S1 ∈ A and S1 ⊆ S2 implies S2 ∈ A. An
access structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a
collection (respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty
subsets of {P1, P2, . . . , Pn}, namely A ⊂ 2{P1,P2,...,Pn} \ {φ},
where φ is the empty set. A set S is called authorized set, if
S ∈ A; otherwise, S is called unauthorized set.
A cipher-policy ABE (CP-ABE) scheme consists of the
following four algorithms:
(i) Setup. The setup algorithm takes 1 as inputs, and
outputs the public key PK and the master key MK,
where (PK, MK) ← KG(1).
(ii) Key Generation.The key generation algorithm takes
the master key MK and a set of attributes SU as inputs,
and outputs a secret key SKU for SU .
(iii) Encryption.The encryption algorithm takes an access
structure A, the public key PK, and a message M as
inputs, and outputs the ciphertext C, which can be
decrypted by the receiver who holds a set of attributes
SU if SU ∈ A.
(iv) Decryption. The decryption algorithm takes the
public key PK, the ciphertext C and the secret key
SKU as inputs, and outputs the message M .
Correctness: An ABE scheme is correct if the user can decrypt
the ciphertext when his attributes satisfy the access structure.
2.1.1. Security model For ABE
With respect to the security of ABE, there are two security
models: selective-set model [23] and full security model [25].
In the selective-set model, the adversary must submit a set of
attributes that she wants to be challenged with prior to obtaining
the public parameters. This limitation is canceled in the full
security model. All previous ABE schemes were proven in the
selective-set model, except [25, 28]. Bethencourt et al. [25]
proposed the full security model, and proved their scheme
in the generic group model. Lewko et al. [40] proposed the
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first ABE scheme which can achieve full security and can be
reduced to the subgroup decision assumptions in composite
order bilinear groups. They used the dual system encryption
[53] technology to prove their scheme. Before the proof, two
additional algorithms are constructed, namely semi-functional
key algorithm and semi-functional ciphertext algorithm.
In this paper, we consider the selective-attribute model which
is slightly stronger than the selective-set model introduced in
[23]. This model is analogous to the selective-ID model in IBE
[17]. We describe this model as follows:
Initiation. The adversary A submits a set of attributes S∗ =
{attr∗} that she wants to be challenged with.
Setup. The challenger runs the setup algorithm, and sends
the public key PK to the adversary A.
Phase 1.The adversary A can query secret keys on the sets of
attributes S1, S2, . . . , Sq1 , where S
∗ ⊆ Si , for i = 1, 2, . . . , q1
. The challenger responds with the corresponding secret keys.
Challenge. The adversary submits two equal length
messages M0 and M1. The challenger flips an unbiased coin
from {0, 1}, and obtains b ∈ {0, 1}. It chooses a set of attributes
S, and encrypts Mb under S, where S∗ ⊆ S. The ciphertext C∗
is responded to the adversary A.
Phase 2.The adversary A can query secret keys on the sets of
attributes Sq1+1, Sq1+2, . . . , Sq . The only constraint is S∗ ⊆ Sj ,
for j = q1 + 1, q1 + 2, . . . , q. The challenger responds as in
Phase 1.
Guess. The adversary A outputs his guess b′ on b.
Definition 2.2. An ABE is (T , q, ε)-semantically secure
(CPA-ABE), if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A
making at most q secret key queries has the advantage
AdvABEA () = |Pr[b′ = b] − 12 | > ε()
in the selective-attribute model.
2.2. Attribute-based oblivious access control
AnABOAC scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
(i) Setup. The setup algorithm takes 1 as input, and
outputs the public key PK and the master key MK,
where (PK, MK) ← KG(1).
(ii) Key Generation.The key generation algorithm takes
the master key MK and a set of attributes SU as input,
and outputs a secret key SKU for SU .
(iii) Commitment. The sender generates his secret-
public key pairs (SSK, SPK) ← KG(1). To
commit messages M1, M2, . . . , Mm under the cor-
responding access structures A1, A2, . . . , Am, the
commitment algorithm takes as input SSK, (M1,
A1), (M2, A2), . . . , (Mm, Am), and outputs the
ciphertexts C1, C2, . . . , Cm. Ci can be decrypted by
the receiver who holds a set of attributes S if S ∈ Ai ,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
(iv) Transfer. The sender inputs his secret key SSK. The
receiver inputs his choices C = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} and
his secret key SKU , where SU ∈ Aσi , for j =
1, 2, . . . , k. The sender and the receiver interact.At the
end, the receiver outputs Mσ1 , Mσ2 , . . . , Mσk , without
releasing anything about his attributes and choices to
the sender; while the sender outputs nothing.
Correctness: An ABOAC scheme is correct if the receiver can
obtain his intended messages when the receiver and the sender
follow the steps of the scheme.
2.2.1. Security model for ABOAC
We define the security model for ABOAC as follows. For the
privacy of the receiver, we require that his choices are uncon-
ditionally secure. Nothing about his attributes is released to the
sender, even the number and a superset of his attributes. For
the security of the sender, we employ the real world and ideal
world paradigms. If there is an adversary in the real world,
there will exist an adversary in the ideal world such that the
outputs of these two adversaries are indistinguishable. We
name this model as half-simulation model, which is similar to
the models in [42, 43].
Privacy of Receiver.
(i) The receiver releases nothing about his attributes to the
sender.
(ii) For any two different choice sets {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk}
and {σ ′1, σ ′2, . . . , σ ′k}, the transcripts received by
the sender corresponding to {Mσ1 , Mσ2 , . . . , Mσk }
and {Mσ ′1 , Mσ ′2 , . . . , Mσ ′k } are indistinguishable. Espe-
cially, the choices of the receiver are unconditionally
secure, if the received messages {Mσ1 , Mσ2 , . . . , Mσk }
and {Mσ ′1 , Mσ ′2 , . . . , Mσ ′k } are identically distributed.
Security of the sender. Suppose that the receiver has
possessed the required secret keys. To define the security of
the sender, we compare the real world and the ideal world
experiments. In the real world, the receiver and the sender
execute the protocol. Meanwhile, in the ideal world, the
functionality of the protocol is replaced by a TTP. The sender
sends all his messages {M1, M2, . . . , Mm} to the TTP. The
receiver submits his choices {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk} adaptively to the
TTP. If σ1, σ2, . . . , σk ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, the TTP responds
{Mσ1 , Mσ2 , . . . , Mσk } to the receiver. An ABOAC scheme is
sender-secure, if for any malicious receiver R in the real world,
there exists an receiver R̂ in the ideal world such that the outputs
of R and R̂ are indistinguishable.
Semantic security. Let S∗ be the set of the attributes that
the adversary holds. If S∗ ∈ Ai , the adversary cannot obtain
anything about the protected message Mi , for i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
2.3. Complexity assumptions
Let G and Gτ be two multiplicative cyclic groups with prime
order p, and g be a generator of G. A bilinear map e : G×G →
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Gτ is a map with the following properties:
(1) Bilinearity: for all μ, ν ∈ G and x, y ∈ Zp,
e(μx, νy) = e(μ, ν)xy .
(2) Non-degeneracy:e(g, g) = 1, where 1 is the identity
in Gτ .
(3) Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to
compute e(μ, ν), for all μ, ν ∈ G.
Let GG(1) be a bilinear group generator that takes as input 1
and outputs the description of groups G and Gτ with prime order
p and a bilinear map e : G × G → Gτ . Let G(1) be a group
generator which takes as input 1 and output the description of
group G with prime order p.
Definition 2.3. (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH)
Assumption) [17]. Let a, b, c,
R← Zp, and g be the
generator of G. The DBDH assumption holds in the
bilinear group (e, G, Gτ ) ← GG(1), if no prob-
abilistic polynomial-time adversary A can distinguish
(A, B, C, Z) = (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) from (A, B, C, Z) =
e(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z) with the advantage
AdvDBDHA = |Pr[A(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1]
− Pr[A(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z] = 1| > ε(),
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b, c, z
R←
Zp and the random bits consumed by the adversary A.
Definition 2.4. (Chosen-Target Computational Diffie-Hellman
(CT-CDH) Assumption) [54]. Let g be a generator of the
group G ← G(1) with prime order p, and x R← Zp. Let
H : {0, 1}∗ → G be a cryptographic hash function. TG(·)
is a target oracle, which takes as input i ∈ Zp, and outputs
gi ∈ G. HG(·) is a help oracle, which takes as input gi ∈ G, and
outputs gxi ∈ G. Let qT and qH be the number of times that the
two oracles are queried, respectively. The CT-CDH assumption
holds in G, if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A
AdvCT-CDHA = Pr[{(θρ+1, iρ+1), . . . , (θ1, i1)}
← ATG(·),HG(·)(p, H, g, gx)] > ε(),
where θj = gxj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , ρ + 1 and qH < ρ + 1 ≤ qT .
The CT-CDH assumption is the analogous version of the
chosen-target RSA inversion (RSA-CTI) assumption [55].
Intuitively, the CT-CDH assumption implies that, after the
adversary A queries the help oracle on the elements of G
for qH times, she cannot compute a new element of G to the
power of x, if its orders on the generator and the qH queried
elements are unknown. Based on the CT-CDH assumption, we
propose the extended CT-CDH (XCT-CDH) assumption, by
replacing the target oracle in CT-CDH assumption with qH + 1
random elements of G. We will prove that the proposed XCT-
CD assumption and the CT-CDH assumption are equivalent.
Definition 2.5 (EXtended XCT-CDH Assumption). Let g
be a generator of the group G ← G(1) with prime order
p, and x
R← Zp. HG(·) is a help oracle, which takes as
input gi ∈ G, and outputs gxi ∈ G. Given the (ρ + 1)-tuple
(ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gaρ+1), the XCT-CDH assumption holds in G, if
no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A
AdvXCT-CDHA
= Pr[gxajρ+1 ← AHG(·)(p, g, gx, gaj1 , gaj2 , . . . , gajρ )]
> ε(),
where ajl ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , aρ+1} ⊆ Zρ+1p , for l = 1, 2, . . . , ρ+1.
Theorem 2.1. XCT-CDH assumption and CT-CDH assump-
tion are equivalent.
Proof. Given the (ρ + 1)-tuple {ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gaρ+1}, we define
H : l → gail ∈ G, where ail ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , aρ+1}, for
l = 1, 2, . . . , ρ + 1; otherwise H : l → gbl , where bl R← Zp.
So, H(·) is a cryptographic hash function.
On the one hand, if A can break the XCT-CDH assumption,
we will show that there exists an algorithm B that can use
A to break the CT-CDH assumption. When A queries help
oracle on {gai1 , gai2 , . . . , gaiρ }, the challenger queries the help
oracle HG(·) in CT-CDH assumption, and responds with
{gxai1 , gxai2 , . . . , gxaiρ }, where ρ = qH . If A can output gxaiρ+1 ,
B can compute θρ+1 = gxiρ+1 , where H(ρ + 1) = giρ+1 = gaiρ+1
and ρ + 1 = qH + 1 > qH . So, B can break the CT-CDH
assumption.
On the other hand, if the adversary A can break the CT-
CDH assumption, we will show that there exists an algorithm
B, who can use A to break the XCT-CDH assumption. Given
{ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gaρ+1}, for qT (qT ≤ ρ +1) target oracle queries,
the challenger responds with gai1 , gai2 , . . . , gaiqT , where aij ∈
{a1, a2, . . . , aρ+1}, for j = 1, 2, . . . , qT . For qH (qH ≤ ρ) help
oracle queries, the challenger queries the help oracle HG(·) in
the XCT-CDH assumption, and responds with {gxai1 , gxai2 , . . . ,
g
xaiqH }, where ail ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , aρ+1}, for l = 1, 2, . . . , qH .
If A can compute θρ+1 = gxiρ+1 , B can compute gxaiρ+1 = gxiρ+1 ,
where H(ρ + 1) = giρ+1 = gaiρ+1 . So, B can break the XCT-
CDH assumption.
Therefore, the XCT-CDH assumption is equivalent to the CT-
CDH assumption.
Note that the XCT-CDH assumption is the computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, if the help oracle HG(·) in
the XCT-CDH assumption is canceled.
Indistinguishability. We define that two distribution families
1() and 2() are (statistically) indistinguishable, if
∑
y
|Prx∈1()[x = y] − Prx∈2()[x = y]| ≤ ε().
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FIGURE 1. ABE with constant cost.
3. EFFICIENT ABE WITH CONSTANT COST
In this section, we will propose a new ABE scheme. The
proposed ABE has constant ciphertext, and efficient encryption
and decryption algorithms. For each encryption requiring t
attributes, there are only three exponentiations and two pairings
executed in the encryption and decryption phase, respectively.
Our idea is derived from the schemes [20, 29, 56]. We describe
our ABE scheme in Fig. 1.
Correctness. The correctness of the scheme is shown as
follows.





































= e(g1, g2)ωe(aU , C2) (3)
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and
C3 · e(aU , C2)
e(C1, sc)
= M · e(g1, g2)ω · e(aU , C2)
e(g1, g2)ωe(aU , C2)
= M · e(g1, g2)ω · 1
e(g1, g2)ω
= M. (4)
Theorem 3.1. Our ABE scheme is (T , q, ε()) semantically
secure (CPA-ABE) in the selective-attribute model, assuming
that the (T ′, ε′()) decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion holds in (e, G, Gτ ), where





Texp denotes the running time of one exponentiation, U is the
set of universal attributes, Sj is the set of attributes queried by
the adversary, for j = 1, 2, . . . , q.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an adversary A who can
(T , q, ε) break ourABE in the selective-attribute model, we will
show that there exists an algorithm B who can (T ′, ε′) break the
decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption as follows.
The challenger generates the bilinear group (e, p, G, Gτ ) ←
GG(1λ), and chooses a generator g ∈ G. It flips an unbiased coin
μ from {0, 1}. If μ = 0, the challenger sends (A, B, C, Z) =
(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) to B; otherwise, the challenger sends
(A, B, C, Z) = (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z) to B, where z R← Zp. B
will output his guess μ′ on μ. B sets g1 = ga , g2 = gb and
g3 = gc.
Initialization. The adversary submits an attribute S∗ =
{attri}.
Setup.B selects n random integers e1, e2, . . . , en
R← Zp, and
computes Ai = gei1 and Aj = gej , for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i}.
B chooses γ R← Zp, and sets h = g−ei1 gγ .
B sends A the public parameters
(e, G, Gτ , g, g1, g2, h, A1, A2, . . . , An).
Phase 1. A queries secret keys on the set of attributes Sσ =
{attrσ1 , attrσ2 , . . . , attrσρ }, where σ = 1, 2, . . . , q1, σρ < n and
S∗ ⊆ Sσi , for i = 1, 2, . . . , q1. B chooses rσ R← Zp, and
computes
aσ = g−rσ g1/ei2 , bσ = gγ/ei2 h−rσ , sσj = (g−rσ g1/ei2 )eσj
for j = 1, 2, . . . , σρ , and σ = 1, 2, . . . , q1.





−rσ = gbγ /aei1 (g−ei+γ /a1 )−rσ
= (g−ei+γ /a1 )b/ei gb1(g−ei+γ /a1 )−rσ
= gb1(g−ei+γ /a1 )−rσ +b/ei
= ga2 (g−ei1 gγ )−rσ +b/ei
= ga2h−rσ +b/ei .




−rσ = ga2hr̂σ ,
g−rσ g1/ei2 = g−rσ +b/ei = gr̂σ
and
(g−rσ g1/ei2 )
eσj = (g−rσ +b/ei )eσj = (gr̂σ )eσj = Ar̂σσj .
Challenge. A sends B two messages M0 and M1. B flips an
unbiased coin from {0, 1}, and gets back with μ̂ ∈ {0, 1}.
B chooses S = {attri , attrλ1 , attrλ2 , . . . , attrλπ } ⊆ U , and
computes




3 = Z · Mμ̂,
where S∗ ⊆ S.
B responds with the challenge ciphertext C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 ).
So, C∗ = (gc, (hAi ∏πj=1 Aλj )c, Z ·Mμ̂) is a valid encryption
of Mû with the correct distribution whenever Z = e(g, g)abc.
Phase 2. A can query secret keys for sets of attributes
Sq1+1, Sq1+2, . . . , Sq , where the only constraint is S∗ ⊆ Sσ ,
for σ = 1, 2, . . . , q. B responds as Phase 1.
Guess. A outputs his guess μ̃ on μ̂. If μ̃ = μ̂, B outputs
μ′ = 0; otherwise B outputs μ′ = 1.
As shown above, the public parameters and secret keys
generated in the simulation paradigm are identical to those in
the real scheme. Now, we compute the probability with which
B can break the DBDH assumption.
In the case where μ = 0, C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 ) is a correct
ciphertext of Mμ̂. Therefore, A can output μ̃ = μ̂ with
advantage at least ε(), namely Pr[μ̃ = μ̂|μ = 0] ≥ 12 + ε().
Since B guesses μ′ = 0 when μ̃ = μ̂, we have Pr[μ′ = μ|μ =
0] ≥ 12 + ε().
If μ = 1, A can obtain no information about μ̂. Therefore, A
can output μ̃ = μ̂ with no advantage, namely Pr[μ̃ = μ̂|μ =
1] = 12 . Since B guesses μ′ = 1 when μ̃ = μ̂, we have
Pr[μ′ = μ|μ = 1] = 12
So, the advantage that B can break the DBDH assumption is
1
2 Pr[μ′ = μ|μ = 0] + 12 Pr[μ′ = μ|μ = 1] − 12 |
≥ 12 × ( 12 + ε()) + 12 × 12 − 12 = ε()2 .
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TABLE 1. The comparison of computation cost.
Schemes Setup Key generation Encryption Decryption
SW [21] (|U | + 1)E |SU |E |SC |E |SC |E + |SC |P
GPSW [23] (|U | + 1)E |SU |E |SC |E |SC |E + |SC |P
OSW [24] 2(|U | + 1)E 3|SU |E 2(|SC | + 1)E |SC |E + |SC |P
BSW [25] 3E 2(|SU + 1|)E 2(|(SC | + 1)|E |SC |E + |SC |P
CN [26] (3|U | + 1)E (|U | + |SU |)E (|U | + 2)E |U |P
HLR [27] 2(|U + 1|)E (|U | + |SU |)E 3E ( |SC |(|SC |−1)2 + 2)E + 3P
LOSTW [28] (|U | + 2)E (|SU | + 2)E (3|SC | + 2)E |SC |E + (2|SC | + 1)P
Waters [29] 3E (|SU | + 2)E 2(|SC | + 1)E |SC |E + (2|SC | + 1)P
ZH [36] 6|U |E (|SU | + 1)E 3E (2|SC | + 1)P
EMONS [37] (|U | + 1)E 4E 3E 2P
ALP [38] (2|U | + 1)E (5|SU | − 2)E 4E (2|U | − 1)E + 2|SC |P
CZF [39] 2|U |(E + P) |SU |E 3E 2P
Our scheme 2E (|SU | + 2)E 3E 2P
TABLE 2. The comparison of type, access structure, security model and the length of ciphertext.
Schemes KP/CP-ABE Access structure Security model Length of ciphertext
SW [21] KP-ABE Monotonic Selective-set |SC |EG + EGτ
GPSW [23] KP-ABE Monotonic Selective-set |SC |EG + EGτ
OSW [24] KP-ABE Non-monotonic Selective-set (|SC | + 1)EG + EGτ
BSW [25] CP-ABE Monotonic Full security (|SC | + 2)EG + EGτ
CN [26] CP-ABE Non-monotonic Selective-set (|SC | + 1)EG + EGτ
HLR [27] CP-ABE Monotonic Selective-set 2EG + 2EGτ
LOSTW [28] CP-ABE Monotonic Full security (2|SC | + 1)EG + EGτ
Waters [29] CP-ABE Monotonic Selective-set (2|SC | + 1)EG + EGτ
ZH [36] CP-ABE Non-monotonic Selective-set 2EG + EGτ
EMONS [37] CP-ABE Monotonic Selective-set 2EG + EGτ
ALP [38] KP-ABE Non-monotonic Selective-set 3EG + EGτ
CZF [39] KP-ABE Non-monotonic Selective-set 2EG + EGτ
Our scheme CP-ABE Monotonic Selective-attribute 2EG + EGτ
Comparison. We compare our scheme with previous schemes
in Tables 1 and 2. By U , SU and SC , we denote the set of universal
attributes, the set of attributes which the user holds and the set of
attributes which the ciphertext requires, respectively. By E and
P , we denote one exponentiation and one pairing, respectively.
By EG and EGτ , we denote one element in G and one element
in Gτ , respectively.
4. ATTRIBUTE-BASED OBLIVIOUS ACCESS
CONTROL
Based on theABE proposed in Section 3, we propose anABOAC
scheme in this section. In our ABOAC, both the identity of the
receiver and the actions performed by him can be protected.
The receiver does not release anything about the content of
the selected services and his attributes to the sender, even the
number and supersets of his attributes are protected. The sender
only knows the number of services selected by the authorized
receiver. We describe our ABOAC scheme in Fig. 2.
Overview. Our idea on ABOAC is that we introduce ABAC
to OT. At the beginning, the receiver authenticates himself to
the issuer, and obtains the secret keys for his attributes. Then,
the sender encrypts all messages under different attributes using
OT technique. At the end, the receiver interacts with the sender
adaptively. We claim that the receiver does not release anything
about the selected services and his attributes to the sender, even
the number and a superset of his attributes. This is because all
services are encrypted under different attributes by the sender,
but he cannot know which services the receiver selected. So, he
cannot conclude anything about the receiver’s attributes from
the selected services.
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FIGURE 2. Attribute-based oblivious access control.
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Correctness. From Equations (1)–(3) in Section 3, we have
z =
e(Cσz1 , sz)
e(aU , Cσz2 )
= e(g1, g2)
ωσz e(aU , Cσz2 )
e(aU , Cσz2 )
= e(g1, g2)ωσz , (5)
z = xzz = e(g1, g2)ωσz xz , (6)













Theorem 4.1. ABOAC is unconditionally receiver-secure.
Proof. For any j received by the sender from the receiver,
there exists an xi such that
j = e(g1, g2)ωσj xj = e(g1, g2)ωσi xi = i,
namely xi = ωσj xj /ωσi mod p. Therefore, from the view of the
sender, whether j is computed from Cσj or Cσi is identically
distributed. So,ABOAC is unconditionally receiver-secure.
Theorem 4.2. ABOAC is sender secure, if the extended
chosen-target Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in Gτ .
Proof. For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary R̂ in
the real world, we will show that there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary R̂∗ in the ideal world such that the
outputs of R̂ and R̂∗ are indistinguishable. The real-world and
ideal-world paradigms are processed as follows:
(1) The sender S sends his messages {M1, M2, . . . , Mm}
to the TTP Charlie.
(2) R̂∗ sends {C∗1 , C∗2 , . . . , C∗m} to Charlie, where C∗i R←
G
2 × Gτ .
(3) R̂∗ monitors the outputs of R̂. If R̂ can out-
put (1, 1), (2, 2), . . . , (k, k), R̂∗ outputs









2, for j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
(4) When R̂ submits {1, 2, . . . , k} to obtain
{1, 2, . . . , k}, R̂∗ queries the help ora-
cle HGτ (·) on {∗1, ∗2, . . . , ∗k}, and gets back
with {∗1, ∗2, . . . , ∗k}, where ∗j = (∗j )ϑ∗ , for
j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
(5) If R̂ can output j , R̂∗ sends σj to Charlie. Charlie
responds with C∗σj3 /Mσj .
(6) R̂∗ outputs {∗1 , ∗2 , . . . , ∗k , ∗1, ∗2, . . . , ∗k, ∗1,




2 , . . . , C
∗
m}.
If R̂ obtains k + 1 messages, R̂∗ does not know which k indices
have been selected by R̂, the simulation fails. Otherwise, we
will show that R̂ can obtain no more than k messages under
the XCT-CDH assumption. If R̂ can obtain k + 1 messages,
he can compute j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , k + 1. Therefore, after
receiving (e(g1, g)ωσ1 )ϑ , (e(g1, g)ωσ2 )ϑ , . . . , (e(g1, g)ωσk )ϑ , R̂
can compute (e(g1, g)
ωσk+1 )ϑ . This will contradict the XCT-
CDH assumption. So, R̂ can obtain at most k messages.
{1, 2, . . . , k} and {1, 2, . . . , k} are random elements
in Gτ . {C1, C2, . . . , Cm} are random elements in G2 ×
Gτ . {1, 2, . . . , k} and {∗1, ∗2, . . . , ∗k} are identically
distributed.
Hence, the outputs of R̂ and R̂∗ are indistinguishable.
Theorem 4.3. ABOAC is semantically secure, if the extended
chosen-target Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in Gτ .
Proof. There are two kinds of adversaries:
Type-I. The adversary can compute j from the
ciphertext (Cj1 , Cj2), then acts as a legal receiver to
interact with the sender.
Type-II. The adversary can compute Mj from
(Cj1 , Cj2 , Cj3).
We will show that Type-I adversary can break the
semantically secure ABE proposed in Section 2, and Type-II
adversary can break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Type-I.Suppose A is Type-I adversary, he can compute j
from the ciphertext (Cj1 , Cj2). There exists an algorithm
B who can use A to break the semantic security of
the proposed ABE. Suppose that Mj is encrypted under
the same set of attributes Sj in the proposed ABE and the
ciphertext is C ′j = (C ′j1 , C ′j2 , C ′j3), where C ′ji = Cji , for
i = 1, 2. B sends (C ′j1 , C ′j2) to A. If A can compute j , B




. This will contradict Theorem 1.
Type-II. Suppose A is Type-II adversary, he can
compute the Mj from (Cj1 , Cj2 , Cj3). There exists
an algorithm B who can use A to break the XCT-




ωj , the aim of B is to compute
(e(g1, g2)
ϑ)ωi . B sends Cj = (Cj1 , Cj2 , Cj3) to A. If A
can output Mj , B can compute (e(g1, g2)ϑ)ωj = Cj3Mj . So
B can use A to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Complexity. We list the computation cost and communication
cost of our ABOAC scheme in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. By
SU , we denote the set of attributes held by the user U . By m and
k, we denote the total number of the messages and the number
of the transferred messages. Additionally, by EG and EGτ , we
denote one element in G and one element in Gτ , respectively.
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TABLE 3. The computation cost of Our ABOAC.
Computation cost
Setup Key generation Commitment Transfer
Scheme I I R S R S
ABOAC 2E (|SU | + 2)E (2(|SU | + 1)P 3mE 2kE + 2 + kP kE
TABLE 4. The communication cost of our ABOAC.
Communication cost
Key generation Commitment Transfer
Scheme I → R S → R R → S R ← S
ABOAC (|SU | + 2)EG 2mEG + mEGτ kEGτ kEGτ
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first proposed a new ABE scheme, where
the ciphertext can be constant. Both the encryption and the
decryption algorithms in our ABE scheme are very efficient.
Based on the proposed ABE, we proposed an ABOAC scheme,
where both the attributes of the receiver and the actions
performed by him can be hidden. The sender knows the number
of the services selected by the receiver if his attributes satisfy the
public access policies. The receiver does not release anything
about the selected services and his attributes to the sender,
even the number and a superset of his attributes. Hence, our
ABOAC scheme provides an intuitive and novel solution to
privacy-enhanced attribute-based access control. Notably, the
computing cost and communication cost in ourABOAC scheme
are independent of the required attributes. So, our ABOAC can
be exploited in the systems where both the bandwidth and the
computing ability are limited, such as WSANs [15], MANETS
[16], etc.
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